





This article is a partial exploration of the relevance and
usefulness of &dquo;models&dquo; for rural development in China. Dating
back to the days of the Border Regions and guerrilla bases of
the 1930s, the Chinese Communist Party has publicized the ad-
vanced (xianjin) and the model (mofan) units, rewarding them
symbolically and materially, and holding them up for study and
emulation. Sometimes these designations are awarded to indi-
viduals, sometimes to entire work units, that is, factories and
industrial enterprises, agricultural teams (shengchanduz), brigades
(da dui), or entire communes. There have been widespread long-
term national campaigns centered on models: for example, the
Lei Feng campaigns that have surfaced periodically over the past
three decades, glorifying an ordinary soldier who embodies the
virtues of hard work, thrift, consideration for others, dedication
to the Party and the Motherland, and self-sacrifice. Or there was
the two-decade-long campaign to &dquo;learn from Dazhai,&dquo; singling
out a poor mountain village that reportedly followed the path
of self-reliance. Using collective effort and sacrifice to transform
the natural environment, laboriously building terraces and irriga-
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tion works, the village raised itself from poverty to self-sufficiency,
and then to surplus production and national acclaim.
Dazhai has been discredited in recent years and has faded from
the national scene. There have been other national-level models
with much shorter lives in the limelight, work units that rose to
national prominence in connection with some particular campaign
(the formation of the cooperatives, the organization of the com-
munes, raising the level of grain production) and then receded
from public view. In addition to the well-known national models,
there are thousands more, publicized within their province, prefec-
ture, or county, which may earn them an article in the Renmin
ribao and repeated mention in the provincial press. They are
publicized as study examples for their local areas. On a more
modest scale than Dazhai, they are also places of pilgrimage for
the leadership of the brigades, communes, and counties in their
area. A leading provincial model may attract as many as 50,000
visitors a year who come for briefings, a guided tour, and discus-
sion. Provincial newspapers, such as the Dazhong ribao in Shan-
dong, give space daily to description and discussion of devel-
opments and events in advanced units, pointing out their recent
achievements and attributing them to the correct application of
the current policy line.
The focus of this article is not, however, a survey and typology
of models. Rather, it looks, within a relatively small geographical
area, at one ordinary village called Taitou, and at the advanced
and model neighboring brigades that Taitou was urged to study
and emulate during the decade of the 1970s. The article is based
on field research conducted in 1979-1980.’ 
Taitou Brigade is located in southeastern Shandong, directly
west of Qingdao. It belongs to the recently created Huangdao
Special District, which since 1977 has been administered by
Qingdao Municipality. Prior to that time, the area was a part of
Jiaonan County and was administered from Weifang. The district
is the site of a new oilport and industrial town that began con-
struction in 1973. Most of the district area is divided between three
peoples’ communes, or a total of 117 brigades. Most of the
brigades are composed of a single natural village. All but 28 are
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grain brigades, meaning that their efforts are concentrated on pro-
duction of wheat, corn, and sweet potatoes. The others are
engaged in fishing and fisheries production, coupled with a small
amount of grain agriculture. A few grain brigades have been per-
mitted to put part of their land into vegetable production for sale
to the growing town at Huangdao, or to grow small amounts of
peanuts, cotton, or soybeans. The primary emphasis at the time
of the research was on grain production, for local needs, and for
increasing grain sales to the state.
Taitou is a grain brigade, and grows little else. Year-end accounts
for 1979 show that 48% of collective gross income came from
grain. Another 7% came from other agricultural production,
specifically peanuts, apples, and peaches. The gross income from
collective animal husbandry was a little over 4%. The rest of the
collective income was attributed to &dquo;industrial sidelines.&dquo; If this
meant brigade or team-owned workshops and processing indus-
tries, we would be talking about an advanced unit. But, in this
case, the 38070 from sidelines represents the income earned by
peasant contract workers on loan to the Huangdao oilport to do
construction of roads and causeways, to transport building
materials from local quarries, to build housing and workshops,
and in a few cases, to work on short-term contract in Huangdao
enterprises. 2
The addition of contract labor to the brigade economy had
brought the distributed collective income up well above the pro-
vincial average or national average by the mid-1970s. Terming
Taitou an &dquo;average&dquo; brigade means only that it falls in the mid-
dle range within its local area. In 1970, Taitou’s per capita distribu-
tion was 62 yuan. By 1974, with the start of oilport construction
work, it had risen to 129 yuan, and by 1979 had reached 176 yuan,
all without any further improvements or additions to the collec-
tive economy. Indeed, without the option of contract labor and
transport work, the 1979 per capita distribution from collective
sources might have been around 91 yuan, close to the national
and provincial averages at that time.3 Those units that were above
the average were generally those assigned to grow some commer-
cial crops, or that had been able to build up sideline enterprises,
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or that were close enough to an urban center to benefit from the
demand for peasant contract workers.
As Huangdao has grown, it has begun to develop its own con-
struction crews and its own transport units. These are expected
to take over much, if not all, of the work done by peasant workers.
The 25,000 persons assigned to live in Huangdao are all holders
of urban residence permits, former residents of other urban locales
who have been transfered to job assignments in Huangdao. The
town will eventually hold 45,000 persons. They, like the current
residents, will have been brought from cities and towns in other
parts of the province. There are plans to build an industrial com-
plex with a variety of factories, some of which will be transfered
from Qingdao along with their current workforce. The new in-
dustrial zone will relieve congestion in Qingdao, and it will absorb
some of the urban unemployed youth. It is not meant to provide
long-term jobs for the rural underemployed. Thus, once basic con-
struction of housing and factory buildings is completed in
Huangdao, the need for peasant contract workers is expected to
decline sharply. The prosperity that Taitou enjoyed in the late 1970s
cannot be maintained unless there are changes in the internal
economy of the brigade. As a brigade without any significant
sidelines of its own, it faces a sharp drop in collective income.
This discussion predates the changes in agricultural policy that
began to be discussed and implemented in the fall of 1980, par-
ticularly the new alternatives of household and individual con-
tracts for production of basic agricultural crops, specialty crops,
and sideline enterprises. At the time of the research, and for most
of the two previous decades, such options did not exist. Household
(&dquo;private&dquo;) sidelines were limited, and discussion of development
of the rural sector and enrichment of the peasantry was within
the context of a collective system of production. With an eye to
what was then seen as the predictable future, the various levels
of leadership within the province had singled out a small number
of villages as models for the majority to consider. These successful
collectives were the recommended alternative to reliance on con-
tract labor.
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The commune of which Taitou is a part, Xingan Peoples’ Com-
mune, had no units that reached true model status, but it counted
about 30 of its 68 brigades as being more advanced. The criterion
seemed to be degree of diversification. In terms of actual per capita
income, the differences between advanced, average, and backward
units within the commune were relatively small - about 15 yuan
between each of the three levels.
One of Taitou’s close neighbors was classed as an advanced
unit. Though still primarily a grain brigade, it had a more diver-
sified economy. Unlike Taitou, where wheat, corn, and sweet
potatoes monopolized virtually all of the arable land, neighboring
Gangtouzangjia Brigade was permitted to restrict grain produc-
tion to 68070 of its farmlands. &dquo;Permit&dquo; is a deliberate choice of
words here: At the time of the research and for at least the previous
15 years, the decisions on the size of crop area assigned to grain
or to other crops were made by cadres at the commune level in
response to higher level requirements for grain sales to the state
and estimates of the needs for local consumption. Brigades had
virtually no control over these decisions.
One reason for permission to follow a more flexible cropping
policy is that Gangtouzangjia has a denser population than Taitou.
Its per capita farmlands are .2 mu less, a difference that qualifies
it as a &dquo;land-short&dquo; brigade (ren duo, di shao).4 Objectively speak-
ing, all of the brigades in Huangdao are land short, compared
to standards elsewhere. Taitou’s per capita farmland is only 1.35
mu. However, in the 1970s, brigades that were recognized as land
short were given more opportunity to diversify, in recognition of
the fact that grains are low-priced commodities. Had Taitou’s
birth-control program been less effective, it too might have been
able to qualify as land short, and move some of its grain lands
into higher priced crops.
The other reason for permission to diversify is that
Gangtouzangjia’s grain productivity per mu is higher, thanks to
a better water supply for irrigation. There is enough easily tap-
ped water that almost every house has its own pump-well. Since
1976, its fields have been served by a system of electric pump-
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wells. Even in years of poor rainfall, such as occurred in the late
1970s, the villagers are assured of stable, high-yield production
and average 400 jin per mu in wheat production. 5
In comparison, Taitou suffers from lack of water. It has two
public wells of the traditional sort, a few private pump-wells, and
a water storage tank into which water can be brought from a small
river. The river previously flowed along the southern boundry of
the residential area of the village. Because of periodic flooding
here and elsewhere along the river route, the river was rechan-
neled as part of a massive public works project in the early days
of the commune. It now flows in a new river bed, considerably
wider than the old one, and about one-fifth of a mile further south
of the village, forming a new border between Taitou’s orchards
and the grain field of the next village. Since Taitou’s grain fields
lie north of the residential area, they cannot as yet all be served
by irrigation ditches, and some of the fields are watered by trans-
porting water in buckets and irrigating the plants one by one.
Gangtouzangjia’s water supply has a twofold effect. First, as
suggested above, it makes for higher productivity in grain pro-
duction. The village is not only self-sufficient in basic grains, it
is able to produce a large surplus to sell to the state without needing
to put all its land and labor into grain production. A village like
Taitou, where wheat yields are 300 jin per mu or less, is instructed
to keep its lands in grain or even to put more of its lands into
grain in order to meet the rising standards for overall grain pro-
duction set by villages served by irrigation. That, at least, was
the policy in the 1970s.
The other effect is that as a land-short unit with a good water
supply, Gangtouzangjia is allowed to put some of its collective
land into vegetable production. By the late 1970s, it had put 150
of its 1670 mu into vegetable crops. It grew eggplants, stringbeans,
tomatoes, cabbages, onions, cucumbers, white potatoes, garlic,
assorted greens, and turnips. Some of this was distributed to the
collective membership, and some was sold to the state as a high-
value cash crop. In contrast, Taitou was allowed to put only 40
mu of its 1300 mu into vegetables and was limited to growing tur-
nips for brigade distribution. In addition, Gangtouzangjia was
allowed to assign 120 mu to soy bean production, while Taitou
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was allowed only 40 mu. Further, Gangtouzangjia was permit-
ted to put 160 mu of grain land into millet, kaoliang, and barley
to vary the monotony of the diet and meet local demand. Taitou’s
allocation for such miscellaneous grains was only 35 mu, a restric-
tion that led many of the villagers to grow them on their small
private plots in place of vegetables.
The land-use patterns in Gangtouzangjia, both collective and
private, provided more cash income and a more varied and bal-
anced diet. This is not a new pattern. An examination of past
cropping patterns in the area suggests that Gangtouzangjia,
because of population pressure and relative success in wheat pro-
duction, was allowed to retain or restore the pattern of diversified
agriculture that had been the norm in pre-Liberation times. This
pattern continued in Taitou, to some extent, until the late 1960s.6 6
But under the increasing pressure of campaigns to &dquo;take grain
as the key link&dquo; and increase sales to the state, Taitou and similar
villages without adequate irrigation were forced to concentrate
on fewer crops, particularly wheat and corn. More favorably
situated villages were able to retain diversity and expand com-
mercial cropping of vegetables, soy beans, and peanuts.
As the policy operated in the 1970s, agricultural success brought
further rewards beyond immediate rise in income. In Gangtou-
zangjia and elsewhere, it opened the way to being given purchase
priority and aid in obtaining more modern technology. In this
instance, it helped to provide the brigade with its own generator,
a harvester, a mechanical seeder, and additional tractors. Such
purchases enabled the brigade to maintain high levels of
agricultural production, and, at the same time, to release some
of the workforce from basic agriculture. In 1975, Gangtouzangjia
was assigned to set up a small factory, making parts for a state
factory in nearby Wangtai. It was not until 1980 that Taitou’s re-
quests for permission to expand its collective economy into indus-
trial sidelines were met: The brigade was assigned to set up a small
printing press to print report forms and simple circulars for the
various administrative levels in the district.
Gangtouzangjia’s surplus labor force is also engaged in con-
struction work and transport work for the oilport. This, together
with indigenously owned sidelines and truck farming, accounts
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for 65% of gross collective income. The difference in income
between the villages is not startling, but it is significant. In the
year-end accounts for 1978, the gross value of production per per-
son was 188 yuan in Taitou and 257 yuan in Gangtouzangjia,
reflected in distributed collective incomes of 132 yuan and close
to 160 yuan respectively.
A more advanced and potentially richer unit is to be found in
neighboring Xuejiadao Commune’s Guanting Brigade. This unit
has been cited as a model for the Huangdao District, and in
1979/1980 was approaching becoming a provincial model. It is
a smaller unit, only 112 households, and in the pre-Liberation
past had been a tenant village. What this means is that some 55%
of the households had rented their land from absentee landlord
families, and another 25% of households had worked as hired
laborers. Most models cited in the Shandong press tend to have
developed out of exceedingly poor beginnings. Guanting falls
within this pattern in which model villages of today are the ones
to which no one wished to send brides in the past. They have a
pre-Liberation history of greater poverty and sharper class strug-
gle than other villages; they then forge ahead and outstrip their
more advantaged neighbors. Taitou would be regarded as among
the advantaged. At the time of Liberation, there was one landlord
family with small holdings, a handful of rich peasants with
holdings of around 7 mu per capita, and most of the population
were middle peasants, with a smaller percentage in the poor peas-
ant/hired laborer category.’ Indeed, to equalize land holdings,
some of the more affluent middle-peasant families were forced
to give up land.
Guanting has been commended as an advanced unit since 1970,
and it was specifically cited as a &dquo;Dazhai-type model&dquo; during that
decade because it had moved accounting up to the brigade level,
thus equalizing income between production teams. This was done
in relatively few brigades in Huangdao. In 1978, the collective pro-
duction value per person was 279 yuan. Agricultural yields here
are higher because 80% of the land is served by a series of elec-
tric pumping stations, and the brigade has its own reservoir. On
the average, the brigade produces 200 jin of wheat per mu more
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than Gangtouzangjia, 300 more than Taitou. Agricultural income
is boosted further by permission to grow peanuts as a commer-
cial crop on 46% of the land during the summer cropping period.
As a related sideline, the brigade owns and operates an oil press-
ing shop.
Of brigade income here, 5507o comes from brigade-owned
sidelines. In addition to the oil pressing shop there is a grain mill,
a noodle-making shop, a kelp farm at the nearby seaside (though
this is not a maritime brigade otherwise), and a mink ranch. Future
plans include a modern chicken farm. They have not expanded
into vegetable farming because of the sandy quality of the soil.
However, brigade lands hold a valuable resource, namely the sand
and stone quarries that are supplying some of the building
materials to Huangdao oilport, and more recently to Qingdao
itself. This resource has done much to fund capital construction
and diversification for the collective.
The second local model, also in Xuejiadao Commune, is
Zhuchadao Brigade. This is a much-publicized model, both for
the local area and for Shandong Province. It too has been a model
since the early 1970s. It is a small community of only 550 per-
sons, which, as in the case of Guanting, facilitated moving ac-
counting to the brigade level. It differs in that it is a fishing village,
located on a hilly island south of Jiaozhou Bay. And it is markedly
richer: The collective gross value of production per capita is
around 1500 yuan.
Fishing is the main source of income. Zhuchadao won the status
of provincial model in 1975 for its overall performance as a fishing
brigade. It was specifically commended for breaking with tradi-
tion and organizing a &dquo;March 8 Fishing Boat,&dquo; that is, a boat
with an all-female crew. Sea-fishing is a male occupation, and
the experiment was short-lived. By 1978, fishing had again become
an all-male occupation. 8
There are also lucrative sidelines. Since the reorganization of
political boundaries and affiliation with Qingdao, the village has
become the site of an experimental station for the Shandong Pro-
vincial Oceanography Institute, which is headquartered in
Qingdao. A research team from the institute lives in the village
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and works closely with the members on tank raising of abalone
and beche-de-mer. Both are very expensive gourmet delicacies.
There is further income from the brigade’s kelp farm and mink
ranch.
From the brigade accounts, it is clear that agriculture provides
no more than 4% of collective gross income. But even though
it is a tiny part of the total economy, it looms large politically.
Despite limited land, the brigade is self-sufficient in grain pro-
duction. Some of the present farm land is hillside terraces con-
structed in the late 1960s and early 1970s, following injunctions
to &dquo;learn from Dazhai.&dquo; In 1976, Zhuchadao received a commen-
dation banner from the provincial government, honoring it as a
&dquo;Dazhai-type advanced model.&dquo; The presence of a freshwater pool
on the island makes irrigation possible. Grain productivity equals
or surpasses that of Guanting, but since the person/land ratio
is only half a mu, Zhuchadao is not expected to sell any grain
to the state, and can keep the surplus for animal husbandry.
In traditional China, fishermen were ranked toward the very
bottom of the class hierarchy. And before Liberation, this island
community was a refuge for the landless and propertyless. Many
lived by fishing, working as hired labor for a few boat owners,
or doing coastal fishing from small sail junks. Others sought off-
island employment as seasonal and day laborers or itinerant ped-
dlers. At land reform, those working in agricultural villages were
not included in the land distribution, and were pressured to return
to Zhuchadao. Some of those who had been working for Qingdao
boat owners were luckier: They were absorbed as crew members
in the new cooperative fishing units operating out of Qingdao’s
harbor, and although their village was not part of Qingdao, they
were able to pass these &dquo;urban&dquo; jobs down to one of their sons.
Those who returned to the island received state assistance, in the
form of loans of state grain, and help in building up a small fishing
fleet of sail junks. By 1955, they were organized as a fishing
cooperative, and owned a few boats with 20 horsepower motors.
The real advance came after 1966, when large state loans were
made available to modernize the fishing fleet. The junks, which
took a crew of four, were gradually replaced by larger craft with
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100 horsepower motors. Their fishing grounds extended south to
Shanghai and north to Bohai Bay. The attendant rise in produc-
tivity made it easy to repay the loans within one or two years,
and to invest further in the development of the fishing fleet and
related sidelines such as net-making and boat repairs. To give some
idea of growth, 20 fishermen, working from a pair of the older
20 horsepower boats, bring in a yearly profit of around 7000 yuan.
The same number of people working a pair of 100 horsepower
boats bring in a profit of 30,000 yuan, and the same crews on
the newest 185 horsepower boats bring in a profit of 40,000 yuan.
The collective still retains some sail junks for coastal fishing, and
some of the older smaller boats are in use, but the majority of
the fishermen are on the large long-distance boats and are away
from the village for much of the year.
With rising profits from fishing, and with expanding sideline
enterprises, the per capita income in this unit far outstrips that
in any of the farming villages in Huangdao. The distributed col-
lective per capita income in 1979 was 315 yuan. This did not in-
clude bonus distributions (averaging another 27 yuan per person),
and the pocket money given to members of the fishing crews dur-
ing their months away from the village. That sum, if distributed
evenly among the population, would come to an additional 38
yuan. In short, the average collective distribution per person comes
close to 380 yuan, an income level double that found in any of
the agricultural brigades in the area, and equal to or surpassing
that of most urban factory workers, low-level technicians, and
lower level intellectual workers.
DISCUSSION
Taitou was periodically instructed to observe and learn from
these three different models in its immediate neighborhood, and
to try to emulate them. Brigade leaders from various units in
Huangdao had been to visit them. Commune leaders were more
likely to make visits to more distant provincial models. There are,
of course, new models at this writing that demonstrate the suc-
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cessful workings of the various responsibility systems inaugurated
since 1980, but we are only discussing those that were operative
during the 1970s. During that decade, and in some years previous,
decisions about the direction and content of development were
not in the hands of the leadership of the brigades and their con-
stituent teams. Taitou’s choice of crops, and the area assigned
to those crops, were determined by the commune leadership in
response to guidelines set by higher levels of administration. Ac-
cess to new machinery, to chemical fertilizers, to water-supply
systems relied on commune-level decisions and agreement by
higher levels of administration. The same was true for acquisi-
tion of raw materials and technology for certain sideline enter-
prises and for obtaining purchase contracts for the commodities
produced.
During the 1950s, and the early years of the commune system,
when Taitou still retained a more diversified cropping pattern, it
operated an oil press and a bean curd processing shop, both car-
ryovers of pre-Liberation enterprises. Both were closed down when
cropping patterns were changed, since local supply dropped sharp-
ly, and continuation of these service industries was no longer war-
ranted for local use, let alone outside sale. Similarly, Taitou
operated a carpentry shop during the 1950s, producing tools,
school desks and benches, and household furniture. At the start
of the Cultural Revolution, this sideline was discontinued and the
skilled work force transfered to grain production. At the end of
the Cultural Revolution, attempts to revitalize the workshop were
unsuccessful. The supply of materials was not available under
the state plans for allocation of lumber. Fortunately, skilled
carpenters were needed in Huangdao, and that is where Taitou’s
carpenters were deployed as contract workers.
If Taitou were to move out of the nongrowth stagnation situa-
tion that it has been in for the past two decades, Gangtouzangjia
would be the most attainable model. To emulate it simply requires
that Taitou be allowed to resume its earlier, more flexible pat-
terns of land use, shifting some of its grain lands into more pro-
fitable commercial crops. The villagers have had experience and
success in the past growing peanuts and soybeans. The land shift
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would probably not even decrease their grain sales to the state
since the addition of soybeans into the local diet would instead
decrease local grain consumption. The protein content of a pound
of soybeans is equal to that found in five pounds of grain. The
village also had success in the past growing vegetables, melons,
and cotton. There are a number of options, some of which have
possibly gone into effect since the time of the research. But even
under the more flexible new economic policies, the growing of
commercial crops on a large scale depends on state demand and
whether units are able to contract with state purchasing agencies.
Expansion into vegetable production seems unlikely. At the time
of the research, the district-level administration assigned vegetable
growing only to a handful of brigades within the total district,
while bringing in a great part of the produce needed in Huangdao
town from outside, primarily from Jiaoxian. The stated reason
was that vegetables from Jiaoxian were of better quality; the alter-
native of upgrading vegetable production within the district did
not seem to be under consideration. There is a potentially larger
market in Qingdao proper. However, between 1949 and 1977 it
was the brigades in Qingdao’s eastern suburbs that were developed
as vegetable brigades. In the post-Cultural Revolution reorganiza-
tion of the municipality, the new western suburbs were not in-
cluded in municipal planning for food supply. Rather, the eastern
suburbs’ brigades were assisted in developing hothouses for year-
round vegetable production. Press reports from the area through
1980-1981 still focused on specialized vegetable production in
Laoshan and eastern district suburbs of the city.
These constraints are minor compared to the difficulties of
emulating Guanting Brigade. That would require far more state
cooperation and assistance. It is possible that over the next decade,
Taitou will be helped to develop its own system of electric pumping
stations and will be linked to a reservoir. With improved irriga-
tion, it would have higher productivity in grain agriculture and
production of other crops. It would have a higher personal in-
come, and the funds and labor power to develop industrial and
agricultural sidelines. Given its nearness to Huangdao and
Qingdao, in time Taitou might be given some processing work
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to do by state factories, or it might be encouraged to supply the
town and city with processed foodstuffs (noodles, bean curd, bean
paste) or craft items for household use such as baskets or brooms.
Emulation of the Guanting model would be furthered if Taitou
were to discover that its lands held some valuable natural resource
equivalent to the quarries that funded part of Guanting’s develop-
ment. In the early years of the commune, Taitou tried to develop
a small iron mine on its lands. Unfortunately, the ore was judged
to be of too low a quality for industrial use, and the operation
was closed down after a short time. Had it worked out differ-
ently, Taitou might have become one of the most advanced units
within its commune, and comparable to Guanting.
The provincial model at Zhuchadao falls within the realm of
&dquo;the impossible dream,&dquo; not only for Taitou but for most, if not
all, agricultural brigades. Zhuchadao can be exempted from grain
sale quotas, but state planning must assure a sufficient flow of
grain to the urban areas and for support of all those state-salaried
workers assigned to the rural areas.9 While the levels of required
grain production that are markedly above the needs of the local
community may be reduced to some extent, they cannot be sharply
cut back or abolished within a large number of brigades. China
has explicitly stated, time and time again, its determination to
be self-sufficient in grain production on the national level, and
to keep its grain imports at a minimum. And even if some grain
brigades were allowed to move entirely into production of high-
value specialty crops for internal circulation and for export, it
is hard to imagine them producing anything near the value that
comes from fishing and fisheries production. It is worth noting
here that within the Huangdao District as a whole, the 28 fishing
brigades annually produced 5,000,000 yuan of income, while the
89 farming brigades together produced 6,000,000 yuan of income.
This difference occurred at a time when only 25070 of the fishing
industry had been &dquo;modernized.&dquo; By now, the income gap must
be even greater. Grain production is necessary, it consumes the
lands and energies of most brigades in China, and even with recent
price increases the peasants cannot become rich from growing
grain. The best they can hope for is to develop additional crops
and sidelines, but even these tend to be modest in their returns
compared to Zhuchadao’s ventures.
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Moreover, the particular model of Zhuchadao required state
assistance on a much larger scale than that offered to agricultural
brigades. There is a real question about whether the state can make
the same level of monetary loans and technical assistance available
to more than a handful of villages. Zhuchadao is, at best, a model
for other fishing brigades, not for Taitou and villages like it. There
are relatively few fishing villages in China compared to the tens
of thousands of farming villages.
Of course, Zhuchadao is not presented as a model of successful
state assistance in local economic development. It is presented
as an illustration of the principles of &dquo;self-reliance&dquo; and of the
correctness and value of taking the socialist road. It is (or was)
meant to demonstrate that organization as a total collective can
transform a poverty-stricken community into one whose wealth
far surpasses that of the neighboring countryside, and whose stan-
dard of living is equivalent to that of the urban population. It
is also meant to demonstrate that the rural areas can increase their
wealth through development of technology for exploiting their
own natural resources; they do not need to look to a transfer of
industries and materials from the cities as a way of raising income.
These aspects of the model have considerable truth to them.
But what the model really demonstrates (and what is not discussed
in the briefings about Zhuchadao or many other model brigades)
is that a unit with a potentially high production value can achieve
that potential if it is assisted with loans, technical advice, and pur-
chase requisitions for the needed technology, not to mention the
added input of high morale that comes with continuous encour-
agement and public praise for each economic advance that is
made.
Thus, while the members of Taitou admired, and to some extent
envied, the progress made by the models with which they were
confronted, it was at the same time clear to them that such results
were not immediately attainable. Without permission and
assistance from levels higher than the brigade they were not attain-
able at all, and a statement of brigade intention or desire to
emulate Gangtouzangjia or Guanting or Zhuchadao would be
meaningless. When Taitou’s income suddenly rose as a result of
contract labor and transport work, most of the money went for
increased personal income and for construction of new housing -
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the latter in response to regional directives that called for a con-
centrated and uniform housing plan in each village. That the new
money did not go into mechanization of agriculture, improved
irrigation, or diversification of the team and brigade economies
was not the fault of the brigade leadership. They had no authority
to do anything other than what they did. Perhaps more money
could have gone into brigade savings (and less into income
distribution) in hopes that someday soon economic policies would
become more flexible, and the brigade would then have a reserve
of working capital with which to improve and expand the village
collective economy. That option would have seemed unrealistic
before 1981 in Shandong. Even after the fall of the Gang of Four,
the explicit policy for the communes in the Huangdao District
and elsewhere in the province was &dquo;take grain as the key link,&dquo;
a policy continued until late in 1980. The only concessions came
in the form of reopening the periodic peasant markets, and the
relaxation of some restrictions on household production and sale
of pigs, poultry, rabbits, garden produce from private plots, and
some household-produced handicrafts. Otherwise, policies con-
tinued as they had been during the Cultural Revolution, with the
commune and district or county levels of administration retain-
ing tight control over agricultural production and over all collec-
tive sidelines. This control could not be circumvented. The ques-
tion of allowing teams and brigades to make their own decisions
about land use was not even raised in Taitou until the summer
of 1980.
It seems reasonable to speculate that the low level of assistance
and encouragement given to most of the brigades in the district,
even after it was reorganized as a suburban area of a large indus-
trial city, is connected to the high priority for rapid and economical
completion of the oilport and its adjacent town. It was impossi-
ble to get any figures on the total costs or the percentages borne
by the city and district compared to the money provided by the
province and national government. However, it was clear that the
costs of basic construction were kept down by utilizing local peas-
ant labor. They were paid at the lower levels of the urban worker
salary scale, and without the additional benefits of medical
coverage, education costs for their children, or payments toward
retirement pensions. Their dependents remained in their home
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villages: there was no need to provide additional permanent hous-
ing for them. All in all, the new urban complex was being built
by using the local labor that could be spared from agricultural
work, which meant that it was being built in the cheapest possi-
ble way.
Had there been equal emphasis on strengthening and diversi-
fying the economies of the area’s teams, brigades, and communes,
money would have had to be diverted away from the oilport. At
the same time, surplus peasant labor would have been diverted
away from the oilport, and absorbed into new collective enter-
prises in their home units. Thus, development of the rural sector
occurred on a limited scale, large enough so that the district leaders
could point to instances of development, but small enough that
it did not interfere with the primary tasks at hand, namely con-
struction of an oilport of national significance, and the
maintenance of high levels of grain sales to the state.
Seen in this light, model villages in China are something other
than what they are intended to be. They are not examples for other
communities to imitate. They are not even social laboratories in
which technicians and social scientists plan for change, guide
change, and overcome the supposed problems of peasant con-
servatism, backwardness, and resistance to innovations. Neither
are they, one hastens to point out, Potemkin villages in the sense
of being fraudulent. They are functioning collectives with real
people benefiting from them. But they resemble the pilot pro-
jects one finds in a number of Third World countries. They are
demonstration models, funded sometimes by their own govern-
ments, sometimes by international development agencies or private
foundations (Rockefeller, Ford, and the like) or combinations
thereof. They show that rural development can be done, if from
somewhere there are loans, new technology and scientific infor-
mation, and new marketing alternatives for what is produced.
They are good places to bring foreign visitors to, but I think most
Third World governments recognize the futility of bringing the
surrounding peasantry to look at them and the frustration that
might be aroused by urging other communities to emulate them.
Since 1980, peasant income has improved, reportedly for a large
number of households. This is due to the restoration and expan-
sion of household private plots, permission to expand household
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sidelines or even develop small collective sidelines between several
households, the legitimization of &dquo;key households&dquo; that specialize
in livestock or poultry production (or similar specializations),
and the institution of various kinds of responsiblity systems in
agriculture. Income has also risen due to encouragement to plant
some commercial crops, particularly cotton and oil-bearing crops
in Shandong. Undoubtedly, some households in Taitou are bet-
ter off than they were a few years ago. But this new liberalization
does little or nothing to develop team and brigade collective indus-
tries. A front-page article in the People’s Daily as late as November
3, 1982, discussed the continuation of &dquo;Left influences&dquo; in Shan-
dong, with specific reference to comparatively low levels of
distribution from the collective economy, failure to grasp fully
the responsibility systems, difficulties in marketing, and the failure
to develop collective industrial sidelines or to relax the restric-
tions on production of small commodities.
It would seem that the basic model of the well-rounded, diver-
sified village collective, which was urged upon Taitou from 1956
to 1980, is still not realizable, and that political decisions from
levels higher than the brigade still shape and control rural
development.
NOTES
1. A total of five months of field research in Taitou (summer 1979, February 1980,
and summer 1980) was conducted with the support of a grant from the Social Science
Research Council Sub-Committee on the Economy of China, and with the cooperation
and assistance of the Shandong Provincial Bureau of Foreign Affairs and Shandong Univer-
sity. I would like to thank all of these organizations for making the research possible.
2. Wages earned by peasant contract workers are paid directly to the brigade or team.
The worker receives his or her earnings partly in grain and other commodities produced
by the rural work unit, and partly in cash. These payments are in line with the earnings
of agricultural workers in the brigade or team, that is, in terms of the value of the collec-
tive workday in the home unit. Since the urban wages are generally higher than the rural
workday, the peasant worker does not receive his or her full earnings. It is shared out
among everyone in the collective.
3. See Beijing Review (January 19, 1981: 5), which gives a figure of 102 yuan as average
per capita net income from collective distribution for all of rural China in 1979. The same
issue, on page 26, provides information on Yantai prefecture in Shandong, which had
an average distribution of 156 yuan. In contrast, Shandong’s western counties of Dezhou
and Licheng were averaging around 50 yuan in 1979, a figure that rose to 90 yuan the
following year when cotton farming was reintroduced.
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4. A mu equals one-sixth of an acre or one-fifteenth of a hectare. A jin is equal to
half a kilo.
5. This is still low in comparison to wheat yields in the north and central areas of
the province. Huangdao has a maritime climate and poor soils that are less suited to wheat
production. Yields are low even with irrigation and application of chemical fertilizer, but
such ecological factors were not taken into account in setting a program of "grain as the
key link" with wheat as the key crop.
6. There are materials on Taitou’s cropping patterns dating from the 1920s and 1930s,
as reported in Martin Yang (1945). Millet and sweet potatoes were the two main staple
crops at that time, with winter wheat and barley as additional main crops. In the sum-
mer, by Yang’s account, close to 60% of the land was given over to sweet potatoes, peanuts,
and soy beans. Swampy lands near the river were used for rice. The brigade accounts
from the early 1960s on reflect a policy of putting increasing amounts of land into wheat
and corn, phasing out millet, barley, and miscellaneous grain crops, and reducing the
acreage for commercial crops in order to increase overall grains production.
7. Commune and district leaders seemed to regard Taitou as a more "politically
backward" village. It was not clear whether this evaluation was based on recent events
or was a carryover from the past. Taitou was not only a heavily middle peasant village,
it had also been the seat of a Catholic church, a Protestant church, and affiliated church
schools prior to Liberation.
8. Similar to Zhuchadao in many respects, including the publicity given to its all-woman
fishing crew, is the provincial model of Dayudao Brigade on the eastern tip of Shandong.
It is also the subject of a one-hour documentary film made by Joris Ivens in the mid-1970s.
9. The majority of commune cadres (administrators) as well as the personnel of the
commune hospital, the secondary school, the post office, the bank, and various shops
in the commune center all "eat state grain." Unlike peasant commune members, they
are paid salaries, from which they purchase their grain, rather than being included in
the grain distributions of the local rural collectives.
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